Off the coast of Peru and Chile, the massive and growing presence of the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet—the largest in the world—is becoming a source of tension. At stake is the fishing of the giant squid, subsidized by Beijing and by vessels sometimes under international sanctions, which affects local fishermen. The recent transparency requirement imposed by Peru had the immediate effect of shifting the fleet to the less regulated ports of Chile, along with the issues of overfishing and the opacity of Chinese operations. The situation reveals how China is adapting to exploit the region's resources and highlights the need for a coordinated regional response.

The Chinese distant-water fishing fleet is by far the largest in the world, operating with estimates of up to 17,000 vessels in international waters. For more than a decade, its presence off the coasts of the South Pacific (Ecuador, Peru, Chile) and Argentina has steadily increased. Today, between 400 and 600 Chinese boats are present in South America. Off the coast of Peru, they mainly fish for the giant squid, a vital resource for local fishermen. According to a study conducted by Milko Schvartzman, activities have intensified over the past decade: between 2014 and 2020, the fishing hours of the Chinese fleet in the Southeast Pacific increased from 278,000 to over 1.2 million. This intensity is considered an indicator of overfishing.

Moreover, Chinese boats regularly make incursions into Peru's exclusive economic zone to fish and refuse to submit to controls or satellite monitoring. The situation is a source of tension in the area. Especially since China massively supports these operations through subsidies for fuel and shipbuilding, exacerbating the fishing capacities available to Beijing; to the point that the presence of Chinese boats off the coast of Peru is no longer a seasonal phenomenon but has become a structural and permanent one.

Consequently, the increase in fishing off the coast of Peru has contributed to a considerable drop in the production and export of squid and mollusks from Peru over the past ten years. In this context, the Peruvian government has taken measures aimed at protecting a local industry essential for the economic dynamism of certain areas of the Peruvian coast.

In 2018, Peru detected illegal fishing activities by Chinese vessels for the first time. The Peruvian government then tightened its controls. In 2024, Peru reaffirmed by decree the requirement for all foreign vessels to use the SISESAT satellite tracking system provided by the Peruvian state for any entry into its waters. Vessels coming near Peru are required to use the nearest ports and thus enter Peruvian territorial waters. However, China seems to refuse to comply with the Peruvian regulator's requirements. The president of CALAMASUR, Alfonso Miranda, confirmed that the Peruvian law was effective, as vessels prefer to dock elsewhere rather than comply with the minimum transparency requirement imposed by Peru. The entries of Chinese vessels into Peru decreased from 61 in the first half of 2024 to zero in the first half of 2025.

The void left by the closure of Peruvian ports was immediately filled by Chile, which has become the new logistics hub for the Chinese fleet. The northern ports, particularly Arica and Iquique, have experienced a significant increase in traffic within a few months. Chile went from zero entries of the Chinese fleet in the first half of 2024 to 25 entries in the first half of 2025, for repair, refueling, and personnel rotation services. This transition is facilitated by the fact that Chile does not have the regulatory requirements imposed by Peru, notably the obligation to use a national satellite positioning system. As Milko Schvartzman points out, China "only uses ports that do not control them."

The issues posed by this Chinese presence have also shifted to Chile: it is confirmed that some ships hosted in Chile, such as the Fu Yuan Yu 7871 and Fu Yuan Yu 7872, are subject to international sanctions by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for illegal fishing, forced labor, and violence on board. Moreover, the Chilean artisanal fleet is already denouncing the unfair competition generated by these subsidized and untraceable foreign vessels. In early October, fishermen from northern Chile protested against the presence of these Chinese boats. According to them, by positioning themselves at the edge of Chile's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Chinese boats significantly hinder the arrival of species into Chile's EEZ.

Disputes over fishing reveal the complexity of Sino-Latin American relations. Just a year ago, China inaugurated the mega-port of Chancay. Built and financed by COSCO Shipping, Chancay is presented as a new Pacific logistics hub, offering South America, and particularly Peru, a direct and more competitive gateway to Asian markets. The strict measures applied by Peru against the Chinese fleet place the two countries in a paradoxical situation: China is currently the world's largest importer of fishmeal and buys about 80% of the fishmeal produced in Peru.

For Chile, the opening of ports to Chinese fishing boats coincides with a strategic rapprochement with China in several sectors, notably the Chile–China Express submarine cable project. There is no doubt that the use of Chilean ports by Chinese boats is a factor in the negotiations between the two countries. However, by providing logistical refuge to a controversial fleet, Chile sends a contradictory message, as it was the first country in the Americas to ratify the Treaty on the Protection of Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and is applying to host the headquarters of its secretariat.

Chinese presence is also increasing in other parts of South America. In Argentina, the hours of Chinese fishing near the Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) increased by 800% between 2013 and 2023. Irregular fishing near the "200-mile" zone poses a constant threat and results in estimated losses of between 2 and 20 billion dollars per year. In Ecuador, the Galapagos region has been the subject of Chinese operations, leading to a record seizure by Ecuadorian authorities of more than 6,600 sharks in 2017. The trafficking of shark fins destined for China is a persistent threat, as evidenced by the record seizure of 10,000 fins (valued at over 11 million dollars) in Peru in November 2025.

The movement of the fleet to Chile shows that China is merely reorganizing to circumvent regulations, always seeking the most favorable conditions. In the face of these intensive fishing practices, it is essential for South American countries to provide a regional and coordinated response that goes beyond national political and commercial interests.