Colombia has a new president-elect, but a fragile one.
This edition examines what De la Espriella's narrow victory means for his governing capacity — and for the energy and security agenda he's promised to deliver. Peru, meanwhile, remains without a confirmed winner more than two weeks after its own runoff. Elsewhere, Market Intelligence covers Codelco's leadership crisis in Chile and overall a busy week across energy, infrastructure and mining.
❐ STRATEGIC OUTLOOK
Colombia: De la Espriella’s already fragile mandate
Colombia's presidential runoff on June 21 ended in the closest result in the country's modern history. Abelardo de la Espriella, a far-right outsider and former criminal defence lawyer, defeated Iván Cepeda by roughly 250,000 votes — 49.66% to 48.70%, on the highest turnout since Colombia's runoff system began in 1994. Cepeda formally challenged results from roughly 33,000 of the country's 122,000 polling stations and incumbent president Gustavo Petro initially refused to recognise a winner. International observers deemed the process orderly, and Cepeda officially conceded his defeat on Wednesday.
Abelardo de la Espriella was elected the new president of Colombia by a small margin. Photo: AFP
On energy specifically — the central question for Colombia's investment outlook — I examined the structural stakes of this election in detail in a previous edition: Colombia's Energy Election. Under Petro’s exploration ban and fracking prohibition, oil and gas production have fallen sharply. Abelardo De la Espriella has pledged to reverse both. This edition focuses on what comes next — the programme he intends to implement, and the institutional conditions under which he will have to do it.
A programme built for confrontation
De la Espriella's plan de gobierno is structured around three pillars: an aggressive security campaign, a sharp reduction in the size of the state, and rapid reintegration with Washington. He has called for coordinated military strikes against armed groups in partnership with the United States, a ban on fentanyl precursor imports, and a specialised task force targeting extortion gang leaders — a programme he describes as "Plan Colombia 2.0." He has vowed to join Trump's Americas Counter Cartel Coalition and the Shield of the Americas regional security initiative. He has also endorsed El Salvador's use of emergency powers and mass incarceration as a security model.
On the economy, the programme calls for cutting the state apparatus by up to 40%, resuming fracking, eliminating select taxes, and committing to strict compliance with Colombia's fiscal rule — alongside a strengthened, more independent fiscal oversight body (CARF) with greater power to constrain government overspending.
On foreign policy, he is in favor of an alignment with Washington. He has pledged to restore diplomatic relations with Israel — severed by Petro over the Gaza war — and, following Argentina's Milei, to relocate Colombia's embassy to Jerusalem.
Governing without the tools
The gap between this programme and De la Espriella's institutional position will probably be the defining story of the next four years. His political movement holds only four seats in the Senate, and Cepeda's Historic Pact retains the largest bloc in both chambers of Congress, though no party holds a majority. As an outsider with no prior elected office and no established party machine, he has no natural path to passing legislation and will depend entirely on ad hoc coalition-building with traditional right-wing parties he spent the campaign positioning himself against.
His preferred strategy of governing through unilateral executive decrees and states of exception poses real risks to Colombia's institutional balance, and is likely to trigger legal battles with the Constitutional Court and the Council of State. Promises to purge the public bureaucracy and pursue legal action against the outgoing administration — including a threatened lawsuit against Cepeda — risk paralysing state agencies and provoking sustained mobilisation from Petro's base before the new government has even found its footing.
Cabinet appointments will be an early signal of his approach: speculation centres on high-profile right-wing figures currently without party affiliation, choices that would reinforce his anti-establishment positioning but could make coalition-building considerably harder.
The fiscal starting point compounds the difficulty. De la Espriella inherits public debt at roughly 60% of GDP and a downgraded sovereign rating — a considerably worse position than Petro faced in 2022, which will constrain how quickly any pro-investment agenda can actually be financed.
🔎 Implications for investors
The direction of travel favours energy and extractive industries, but the timeline is uncertain. A government this institutionally weak will likely need to prioritise — and security, not energy policy, is where De la Espriella has staked his political credibility. His governing coalition of traditional right-wing voters, Petro-sceptics, and protest voters remains fragile, and the mandate to implement sweeping reform is far from secured.
The inauguration on August 7 will mark the start of a month-long window in which cabinet appointments and the posture towards the opposition will indicate whether this is a presidency built for negotiation or for permanent confrontation — and that choice will shape how much of the stated programme survives contact with Congress.
❐ POLICY & MACRO WATCH
❍ POLITICS & ELECTIONS
Venezuela: The coalition of opposition parties formally backed US-mediated diplomatic talks with the Maduro administration to secure a constitutional path toward democratic elections. (Infobae)
Peru: The presidential runoff result remains unresolved more than two weeks after the vote. Keiko Fujimori holds a lead of roughly 40,000 votes (50.11% to 49.89%) with over 99.7% of ballots counted, but Roberto Sánchez has declared he "will not recognise" a Fujimori victory and is contesting results from 119 consular offices abroad without presenting supporting evidence. (Emol)
❍ MACROECONOMICS
Argentina: The World Bank approved a $2 billion support package to help the Milei administration manage upcoming sovereign debt maturities due next month. (El Economista)
Cuba: President Díaz-Canel introduced a sweep of 175 regulatory measures opening critical economic areas to private players, marking the island's largest economic transition in several decades. (France 24)
Colombia: Year-on-year economic expansion cooled to 3.34% in April, slowing down from March's pace as agricultural and mining output softened across the country. (El Economista)
Uruguay: The Ministry of Economy submitted an ambitious 240-article Competitiveness Bill to Parliament to slash bureaucratic red tape, open market competition, and lower the local cost of living. (El País)
Chile: The newly formed Kast administration aims to fast-track 600 key investment projects valued at $60 billion by aggressively dismantling regulatory and environmental permitting bottlenecks. (La Tercera)
❐ MARKET INTELLIGENCE
Key signals from the Market Intelligence section this week:
State-owned commodity champions are under structural strain: Codelco's production crisis and leadership overhaul in Chile, and Colombia's oil sector decline, both point to the limits of state control in capital-intensive extractive sectors — even as private operators like Antofagasta Minerals and the Vicuña copper project continue to expand.
Critical minerals remain the region's most contested investment frontier: Peru's mining sector is pricing in election stability and Brazil's BNDES-Vale-Petrobras alliance signals a coordinated state push into the sector.
Infrastructure and energy financing is accelerating across the political spectrum, from Brazil's record-speed transmission project to Uruguay's competitiveness overhaul — a reminder that capital continues to move even where politics remains unsettled.
❍ AGRIBUSINESS & FOOD SYSTEMS
Honduras: Coffee exports successfully surpassed the $2 billion mark for the second consecutive crop cycle, registering $2.02 billion by mid-June on the back of strong international pricing. (El Heraldo)
Peru: Domestic sugar cane prices plummeted by 65% from historical peaks, triggering agricultural protests as farmers struggle with doubled fertilizer costs. (Infobae)
❍ MINING & CRITICAL MINERALS
Chile: Codelco's leadership overhaul accelerates as production crisis deepens. The state copper giant posts an 8% year-on-year production decline and carries $24 billion in debt. A separate scandal over inflated 2025 output figures has triggered $14.3 million in bonus clawback disputes with unions. (The Chile Brief)
Peru: Mining profits are projected to reach a record-breaking $9 billion as foreign capital flows back into local assets following the stabilization of the electoral cycle. (Gestión)
Brazil: State bank BNDES signed a strategic alliance with mining giant Vale and oil major Petrobras to coordinate and finance critical mineral ventures. (Valor Econômico)