Like most South American countries, Argentina was subjected to 10% tariffs by the Trump administration in April 2025. Since then, trade negotiations have been initiated on all fronts for Washington, which has turned its trade policy into a true instrument of "coercion"; each country fears being the loser in this reshaping of international trade. The case of Argentina is no exception to the rule. The Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment signed between the two countries is fundamentally geopolitical but also corresponds to a political alignment between the two governments in place.
Indeed, Donald Trump and Javier Milei have grown closer in recent months. The American president has expressed his support for his Argentine counterpart a few weeks before decisive legislative elections, and the U.S. Treasury has committed to financially supporting Javier Milei's reforms. This is significant backing for the Argentine president, who has been facing difficulties in recent months. Furthermore, Javier Milei has long asserted his ideological alignment with the neo-liberal model—contrary to his criticism of the Chinese model—and has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Donald Trump. The reforms he has implemented since his election have aimed to open the Argentine market to foreign, particularly American, companies. Therefore, Argentina represents a valuable ally for Donald Trump in South America and market opportunities for American businesses. Washington stands to gain from a sustainable recovery of the Argentine economy.
USA - Argentina: an unbalanced agreement
Just like other "deals" signed by Washington with other countries, the agreement signed between the two countries is merely a "framework," meaning it does not currently delve into details but establishes a framework for discussions on the development of trade relations and investments. The initial basis of these discussions is the reduction of tariffs and reciprocal commitments:
As part of this agreement, Argentina agrees to significant concessions in terms of market access, regulation, and digital sovereignty, perceived by some as a "submission" to Washington:
Argentina commits to granting preferential access to American goods in numerous sectors (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, technology products, medical devices, automobiles). The Argentine market specifically opens up to the importation of live cattle, poultry, pork, and American dairy products.
The country also commits to a structural reform of its intellectual property regime and to automatically accept drug certifications issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Argentina agrees to recognize the United States as an adequate jurisdiction for cross-border data transfers (including personal data) and establishes that the United States is a valid jurisdiction for storing data of Argentine citizens.
Conversely, the United States offers certain targeted benefits, with legally non-binding guarantees:
Washington proposes to eliminate tariffs on "certain natural resources not available" on their territory and urgently needed by the United States: lithium, copper, uranium, rare earths.
The United States promises the removal of the 10% tariff imposed on Argentine meat. However, the historical operation would apply with a 25% out-of-quota tariff, established by Congress. This is a key point for Argentina, which aims to "significantly" expand beef access to this market.
Argentina's concessions are therefore significant and indeed raise questions in terms of economic, regulatory, and technological sovereignty. In particular, the opening of the market to the American agro-industry is a real subject of controversy for Argentine farmers. The removal of the 10% tariff on beef imports is a meager compensation offered by Washington. Moreover, the agreement does not explicitly guarantee new waves of investments. Although the Argentine government has promised that the agreement "creates conditions to attract investment," the text contains only statements of intent, without new guarantees or mechanisms, beyond the protections already offered by the 1994 Bilateral Investment Treaty and the Large Investment Incentives Regime (RIGI). Investment will therefore mainly depend on Argentina's macroeconomic stability.
USA - Latin America: other agreements sealed by Washington
On November 13th, the White House also announced similar trade agreements ("Frameworks") with other Latin American countries: Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador. These agreements are also with governments that are somewhat aligned with the Trump administration.
The objective seems clear for Washington: these agreements serve to reaffirm American influence in the Western Hemisphere, where China has become a leading supplier and investor over the past two decades. The Trump administration aims to counter Chinese presence by recalibrating supply chains and bringing countries in the region back into the U.S. fold.
In Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador, Washington grants tariff adjustments on certain products, particularly in the agriculture and textile sectors. However, these benefits are conditional. The "deals" crafted by Donald Trump also serve as a means of coercion to force these countries to accept American demands, particularly in combating illegal immigration, as El Salvador and Guatemala are the source of significant migratory flows to the United States.
So far, the Trump administration has negotiated "deals" with most Latin American countries. Discussions are still ongoing with Mexico and Brazil, the two largest economies in Latin America. The governments of Lula and Claudia Sheinbaum have shown some resistance to negotiating with Donald Trump but are expected to eventually reach an agreement with the American president. Donald Trump will then have succeeded in ensuring the region's commercial alignment with the United States, by force.